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My marching orders from Dean Kearney for this year’s Boden Lecture are
to commemorate the sesquicentennial of the Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment, which was ratified in 1868. This ought to be a much easier task
now than it would have been at the demisesquicentennial—halfway between
1868 and today—because I think it’s fair to say that the Fourteenth Amendment
largely failed to live up to its promise during the first half of its existence. At
that halfway mark in 1943, African Americans, who were supposed to be the
amendment’s primary beneficiaries, suffered under a pervasively authoritarian
Jim Crow regime in the South and faced rampant discrimination and hostility
in the North. The Supreme Court had begun to chip away at Jim Crow in a few
isolated decisions, but these hadn’t made much practical difference. Fourteenth
Amendment demisesquicentennialists—if there were any—would have had
very little to cheer about in 1943.
We live in a very different constitutional world today, with a robust and
vital Fourteenth Amendment at its center. And so it would be easy to tell you
a heartwarming story about the amendment’s second act as one of the great
comeback sagas in American history. But failures are often more interesting
than successes. I want to focus on the Fourteenth Amendment’s bad years,
because I think that they can tell us something important about constitutional
theory.

* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay is a lightly edited version of the Robert
F. Boden Lecture presented at Marquette Law School on September 20, 2018. I am grateful to Dean
Joseph Kearney for his invitation and wonderful hospitality during my visit to Milwaukee, to my friend
David Strauss for his commentary, and to Joseph Blocher, Erin Blondel, James Boyle, Guy Charles,
Thavolia Glymph, Craig Goldblatt, Sean Griffith, Jed Purdy, and Richard Squire for comments on the
manuscript.
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On the surface, at least, contemporary constitutional theory is dominated by
a debate between originalism,1 which holds that judges should interpret the
Constitution in line with the original public meaning of its text at the time that
the constitutional provision in question was adopted, and living
constitutionalism, which holds that constitutional meaning should evolve over
time.2 The Fourteenth Amendment has been a critical battleground of this
debate. In particular, lawyers, scholars, and judges have disagreed about
whether the amendment’s Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to
prohibit school segregation, as in Brown v. Board of Education,3 even though
the amendment’s framers probably did not envision this particular reform,4 and
whether the amendment’s Due Process Clause can be stretched to include rights
of privacy and reproductive freedom that would have surprised the generation
that ratified the amendment.5 In a nutshell, these debates posit that living
constitutionalism would allow courts to read what many regard as the moral
progress of the last fifty years or so into the Fourteenth Amendment and use
that amendment as a vehicle for further reform.
I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s bad early years put a different
spin on this debate. Living constitutionalists identify a number of different
mechanisms or modalities by which judges should assess the extent to which
constitutional meaning has “evolved” over time. These include broad changes
in public opinion,6 electoral or legislative victories by proponents of a new
constitutional interpretation,7 the achievements of social movements,8 and the
common-law-style development of constitutional meaning through decisions of
1. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
2. There is no canonical statement of the living constitutionalist position, and—as will be
evident—it comes in a number of quite different flavors. For an influential, albeit very general,
articulation of the living constitutionalist view, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“[T]he genius of the
Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in
the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Compare, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1995), with Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
5. Compare, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975), with Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
6. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
7. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81–85 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005); Ilya Somin, The Tea
Party Movement and Popular Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 300 (2011).
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the judges themselves.9 I am here to tell you that, in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s first seventy-five years, every one of these modalities strongly
supported the compromise or even abandonment of the amendment’s core
purpose of freedom and equality for black Americans. Strong social
movements supported the end of Reconstruction and the reestablishment of
white supremacy in the South, as well as the reunion of North and South
predicated on a reinterpretation of the Civil War’s meaning. These movements
influenced both major political parties, affected electoral outcomes, and then
legislated their interpretation of constitutional meaning into law. And the
judiciary responded by interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments narrowly
and redirecting their concern with racial equality into other channels as a
limitation on government regulation of the market.
That is why my title for this lecture is “Dying Constitutionalism.” Justice
Antonin Scalia used to insist that the Constitution was “dead” in a quite
different sense: He meant that constitutional meaning was static, and that the
whole point of having a constitution was to lock in particular rights and
institutional arrangements and make them nearly impossible to change even if
we might want to, later on.10 Constitutionalism is about tying yourself to the
mast; you don’t want a loosey-goosey constitution, such that you can slip out
of it and throw yourself overboard to meet the pretty Sirens.
But this static model may not fit something like the Fourteenth Amendment
very well. That amendment was adopted by men who were themselves caught
in an unstable tension between their own racism—the best of them were still
products of their times—and the political principles of the Declaration of
Independence, which told them that God had created all men equal. It makes
sense to view the amendment as aspirational or redemptive, aiming at a state of
affairs that had not yet been achieved.11 And so rather than protecting existing
values against future backsliding, the amendment is importantly a source of
forward pressure.

9. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996); Ernest A. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 862.
11. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 981
(2012) (observing that “the [Fourteenth] Amendment announces majestic principles that we must
constantly strive, prospectively, to realize”). Some constitutionalists believe that all constitutional law
has this character. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN
AN UNJUST WORLD 25 (2011) (asserting that “our system of government has a point, a trajectory: It
works toward the realization in history of the promises made in the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution”).
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This makes the Fourteenth a favorite amendment for living
constitutionalists. But progress isn’t inevitable, even when a constitutional
marker has been laid down. Living things don’t always grow, mature, or
flower; sometimes they mutate, wither, or decay. It’s not hard to think of
constitutional provisions that have “evolved” right out of the Constitution—the
Contracts Clause in most of its applications, for example, or the Fourteenth
Amendment’s own protection of national “privileges or immunities.” These
clauses have been laid low by “dying constitutionalism.”
This potential for constitutional corruption and decay poses a serious
problem for any organic model of constitutionalism. But while I certainly don’t
come to praise living constitutionalism, neither am I here to bury it. At the end
of the day, despite it all, I consider myself a living constitutionalist, not an
originalist. And as I will explain, even many originalists agree that some sort
of evolutionary approach is inevitable, especially for open-ended and
aspirational provisions such as the Fourteenth Amendment. But it is essential
that living constitutionalists understand the downside risks that come with any
evolutionary model of constitutionalism. Living constitutionalism needs a
cultural shift, based on a sense of tragedy, to temper its progressive optimism.
Progress can and does happen, but it is by no means inevitable, and sometimes
constitutional law goes to hell in a handbasket. That is what happened in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s first seventy-five years.
I.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S LOST YEARS

The Fourteenth Amendment’s central aim was to confer on black
Americans “equality before the law, overseen by the national government.”12
Equality before the law did not exist in 1868, either in the South or in the North.
The Fourteenth Amendment was a promise to create that equality.13 Its framers
understood that one could not simply write out new rights on paper and expect
them to be respected; that is why the Fourteenth Amendment, more than any
other amendment in the Constitution, is centrally concerned with institutional
mechanisms for its own implementation. Section 2 created strong electoral
incentives to let black people vote, with the hope that the franchise would in
turn allow them to protect their own interests politically. Section 3 aimed to
destroy the existing political class in the South, which had held black people
down for so long, by disqualifying ex-Confederates from office. And—most
important—Section 5 empowered Congress to implement the amendment’s

12. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 256
(1988).
13. See id. at 258–59.
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provisions by “appropriate legislation.” Congress thus gave itself a primary
voice in fleshing out the meaning of Section 1’s open-ended phrases.
The Fourteenth Amendment was “an effort by Republicans to
constitutionalize the ‘fruits’ of the War.”14 The Civil War had begun as a war
for union—not emancipation, and certainly not equality. But by 1863,
President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation made official what
was already generally acknowledged: that is, that freedom had become a Union
war aim. And although there is no “equality proclamation” to go with
emancipation, historians argue that equality had become a third Union war aim
by Appomattox.15 Once the guns fell silent, Congress set about following
through on that aim with a series of Civil Rights Acts and three constitutional
amendments. Southern historian C. Vann Woodward, looking back, concluded
that “[s]o far as it was humanly possible to do so by statute and constitutional
amendment, America would seem to have been firmly committed to the
principle of equality.”16
“And yet,” Professor Woodward noted, “we know that within a very short
time after these imposing commitments were made they were broken. America
reneged, shrugged off the obligation, and all but forgot about it for nearly a
century.”17 White Southerners fought Reconstruction with fraud, deceit, and
terroristic violence. Northern Democrats largely opposed black equality, and
Republicans mostly gave up on it after 1876. “[T]he evidence” drove
Woodward “to the conclusion that the radicals committed the country to a
guarantee of equality that popular convictions were not prepared to sustain, that
legal commitments overreached moral persuasion.”18
In the beginning, though, there was progress. It is true that, as Professor
Michael Klarman has observed, “Reconstruction delivered far less to blacks
14. Id. at 251; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988) (“What was politically essential [to the generation that
framed and ratified the Amendment] was that the North’s victory in the Civil War be rendered
permanent and the principles for which the war had been fought rendered secure . . . .”); HAROLD M.
HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE
CONSTITUTION 466 (1973) (“[W]hatever else the Fourteenth Amendment was supposed to
accomplish . . . high among Republicans’ priorities was the need to make certain impacts of the Civil
War and Reconstruction more permanent.”).
15. See C. Vann Woodward, Equality: The Deferred Commitment, in THE BURDEN OF
SOUTHERN HISTORY 69, 75 (3d ed. 1993).
16. Id. at 78; see also DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN
MEMORY 54 (2001) (“During the two crucial years that the radicals held sway, they did seek to make
the nation paramount over the states, and at least to root the idea of racial equality in the American
imagination.”).
17. Woodward, Equality, supra note 15, at 78–79.
18. Id. at 83.
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than they hoped.”19 In particular, the national government disappointed hopes
that it would confiscate slaveowners’ property and redistribute it to the
freedpeople.20 Nonetheless, with the Fifteenth Amendment soon in the books
and the Union Army occupying the defeated Southern states, black people
exercised real political power in the South.
But enthusiasm for Reconstruction faded quickly, for both good and bad
reasons. The good reason was that Americans have always been profoundly
uncomfortable with military rule, and even Republicans worried about the
incursions on civil liberties that such rule often entailed. The bad reason is that
white Northerners were simply never sufficiently committed to equality for
black people to stay the course of Reconstruction in the teeth of Southern
violence and recalcitrance. And so, one by one, Southern state governments
slipped back into the hands of white supremacist “Redeemers.”
An illustrative battle in this long war occurred over Mississippi’s election
in 1875.21 White Democrats had been forming (and arming) “White Men’s
Clubs” as a vehicle for restoring white supremacy. When Democrats swept the
1874 congressional elections nationwide, it was widely interpreted as a
repudiation of Reconstruction. Mississippi’s White Men’s Clubs saw it as a
green light and vowed to “carry the election [of 1875] peaceably if we can,
forcibly if we must.”22 On reflection, they went straight for “forcibly,”
producing “dead books” with the names of black Republicans, disrupting
Republican meetings and running off Republican politicians, and assaulting or
murdering black leaders and burning black homes.
As the death toll mounted into the dozens, Mississippi’s Republican
governor, Adelbert Ames, asked President Ulysses S. Grant for federal troops.
Grant responded that the public was “tired out with these annual autumnal
outbreaks in the South” and refused to intervene unless Mississippi Republicans
first raised their own militia.23 Well-armed whites were spoiling for exactly
that sort of fight and threatened to wipe a black militia “from the face of the
earth”; Republicans declined in order to avoid igniting a race war.24 On election
eve, armed white riders drove freedpeople from their homes and threatened to

19. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY
59 (2007).
20. Id. at 59–60.
21. See generally FONER, supra note 12, at 558–63; KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra
note 19, at 64; RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE GILDED AGE, 1865–1896, at 305–06 (2017).
22. Quoted in KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 64.
23. See FONER, supra note 12, at 560–61.
24. Quoted in WHITE, supra note 21, at 305–06.
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murder them if they voted.25 It worked. The overwhelmingly black Yazoo
County, for example, returned only 7 Republican votes against more than 4,000
Democratic ones.26 Democrats took control of the legislature, removed the
lieutenant governor, and impeached Governor Ames.27 He fled the state.28
Mississippi had been “redeemed.”
A year later, in 1876, the nation deadlocked over the presidential race
between Democrat Samuel J. Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. The
election came down to three not-yet-redeemed Southern states—Florida,
Louisiana, and South Carolina—in which rampant fraud and violence had
marred the voting. Republican state election officials decreed Hayes the
winner, but Democrats “cried fraud and threatened to march on Washington
and reignite the Civil War.”29 A special commission including several Supreme
Court justices failed to transcend partisanship and resolve the dispute. But
Republicans struck a deal with Southern Democrats, who agreed to support
Hayes for president in exchange for the withdrawal of troops from the South.30
The remaining Republican governments in the South fell as Hayes took office.31
One Louisiana freedman remarked that “[t]he whole South—every state in the
South—had got into the hands of the very men that held us as slaves.”32
In Eric Foner’s judgment, the compromise of 1877 “marked a decisive
retreat from the idea, born during the Civil War, of a powerful national state
Blacks’
protecting the fundamental rights of American citizens.”33
Reconstruction-era gains did not evaporate overnight. But by 1890, race
relations in the South “had begun what was to be a long downward spiral.”34
Between 1895 and 1900, lynchings of black Americans averaged 101 per

25. See FONER, supra note 12, at 561.
26. Id.; WHITE, supra note 21, at 306.
27. See FONER, supra note 12, at 562; WHITE, supra note 21, at 306.
28. See FONER, supra note 12, at 562; WHITE, supra note 21, at 306.
29. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 66. See generally FONER, supra note
12, at 575–76; WHITE, supra note 21, at 330–31; C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION:
THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 6–7 (1966).
30. See KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 66. The full story is more
complicated, see generally WOODWARD, REUNION & REACTION, supra note 29, but this thumbnail
sketch will do for present purposes.
31. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 91–92 (1991).
32. Louisianian Henry Adams, quoted in FONER, supra note 12, at 582.
33. Id.
34. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 10 (2004); see also NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 81 (“[S]outhern
blacks were only able to slow, not stop, the counterrevolution.”).
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year.35 Although Southern states generally avoided formally disenfranchising
blacks, they adopted poll taxes and literacy tests, which largely prevented
blacks from voting.36 And when this didn’t do the trick, there was always
fraud—and, especially, mayhem.37
In the 1890s, for example, a rare alliance of Republicans and Populists
managed to take over the state government in North Carolina, but Democrats
resolved to take it back in 1898 under the banner of white supremacy. In
Wilmington, a Democratic party leader told his followers that if a black man
tried to vote, “kill him, shoot him down in his tracks.”38 The day after the
Democrats prevailed in the general election, a large white mob burned down
the Wilmington offices of a black newspaper. The mob intimidated white
Republican officials into resigning their offices and fleeing the city and then
rampaged through black neighborhoods—murdering a dozen black residents
and driving nearly 1,400 from the city.39
Episodes such as “Bloody Wilmington,” as it became known, persuaded
many Progressives that legal segregation and disfranchisement were humane
alternatives to violence.40 That—and a fair dose of racism—may explain why
Progressives did so little to challenge segregation and sometimes even acted to
further it. Restrictions on voting, administered by white officials exercising
broad discretion, “virtually eliminated black political participation in the
South” early in the twentieth century’s first decade.41 Black voter registration
in Louisiana fell from 95.6 percent, before an 1896 registration law, to
1.1 percent in 1904; estimated black voter turnout in Mississippi fell from
29 percent in 1888 to 2 percent in 1892 to 0 percent in 1895.42
Formal segregation, which had not been the rule in the decades immediately
after Reconstruction, began to increase about the same time.43 The first wave
35. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 3.
36. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 83–87 (3d rev. ed.
1974); NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 106–08.
37. See, e.g., NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 92 (quoting the admission of a prominent Mississippi
Democrat in 1890 that “we have been stuffing the ballot boxes, committing perjury, and . . . carrying
the elections by fraud and violence” since 1875) (emphasis omitted).
38. Quoted in KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 75.
39. See id. at 75–76; MILTON READY, THE TAR HEEL STATE: A HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA
304–05 (2005).
40. READY, supra note 39, at 305.
41. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 77; see also NIEMAN, supra note 31,
at 107–08.
42. See KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 77; see also NIEMAN, supra note
31, at 107 (“By 1910, black registration had decreased to fifteen percent in Virginia and to less than
two percent in Alabama and Mississippi.”).
43. See NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 108–09.
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of railroad-segregation laws, beginning in Florida, passed in the late 1880s and
early 1890s; much of the remainder of the South followed beginning in 1898.44
These laws may have reflected the increased political power of lower-class
whites, who valued segregation for boosting their own precarious status; it also
didn’t help that in 1883 the Supreme Court struck down the 1875 Civil Rights
Act, which would have preempted state segregation laws.45
It’s important to understand that the deterioration in conditions for black
Americans was not simply a Southern phenomenon. As Professor Klarman has
explained, “[w]ithout northern acquiescence, southern racial practices could not
have become so oppressive.”46 Northern concern for Southern blacks declined
for a variety of reasons. The early stirrings of the Great Migration sent
increasing numbers of blacks north around the turn of the century, leading there
to “discrimination in public accommodations, occasional efforts to segregate
public schools, increased lynchings, and deteriorating racial attitudes.”47 The
influx of millions of southern and eastern Europeans, beginning in the 1880s
and accelerating after 1900, made the situation worse by exacerbating concerns
about racial purity in the North; this naturally led some Northerners, especially
in New England, to sympathize with Southern racial attitudes.48 That sympathy
was further compounded by national–imperial dilemmas arising from the
Spanish–American War in 1898 and the consequent acquisition of Puerto Rico
and the Philippines—territories inhabited by peoples that both Northerners and
Southerners tended to consider inferior.49 Finally, a strong desire in both North

44. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 18.
45. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 34, at 18.
46. Id. at 12; see also WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, supra note 36, at 69 (“The
South’s adoption of extreme racism was due not so much to a conversion as it was to a relaxation of
the opposition.”).
47. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 12. The core years of the “Great
Migration” would not begin until World War I, see generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF
OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 8–9 (2010), but movement was
already picking up in the 1890s and 1900s. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
34, at 12 (noting that black migrants numbered “only 49,000 in the 1870s and 62,000 in the 1880s,
[but] increased to 132,000 and 143,000 in the following two decades”). Eventually, “some six million
black southerners” traveled North and West out of the South between 1915 and 1970. WILKERSON,
supra, at 9.
48. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 12.
49. See id. at 12–13; see also WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, supra note 36, at
72 (“As American shouldered the White Man’s Burden, she took up at the same time many Southern
attitudes on the subject of race.”); BLIGHT, supra note 16, at 347 (“Infused with imperial language,
nationalism, and racial supremacy, the Spanish–American War provided Americans, North and South,
with new ways to cement their reunion.”).
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and South for national reconciliation encouraged the sections to sweep their
differences over race under the rug.50
As the Great Migration of Southern blacks to the North got underway in
earnest at the beginning of the twentieth century, “northern discrimination and
segregation proliferated.”51 For example, “[m]any northern public schools
became segregated for the first time in decades, even in former abolitionist
enclaves such as Boston and Ohio’s Western Reserve.”52 Newly arrived in the
North, blacks found jobs that traditionally would have been available to them
to be going to European immigrants instead; worse, they faced hostility from
labor unions, which generally excluded them and feared their use by employers
as strikebreakers.53
And the North had its own anti-black violence. In Chicago in 1919, for
example, a swimming-beach altercation resulting in the death of a black
teenager touched off a rampage of white gangs through black neighborhoods;
thirty-eight people (twenty-three blacks and fifteen whites) were killed, and
more than 500 others were injured before the state militia subdued the
combatants.54 As author Isabel Wilkerson has put it, “riots would become to
the North what lynchings were to the South . . . . Nearly every big northern city
experienced one or more during the twentieth century.”55
In both North and South, then, social practices became more oppressive
after the end of Reconstruction, and those practices were increasingly given
legal sanction by state and local officials. This new state of affairs, moreover,
was increasingly reflected in federal statutory and constitutional law. As
Southern governments moved to disfranchise black voters, Congress failed to
invoke Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided for a reduction
in the congressional representation of states excluding male voters on the basis
of race.56 Section 2 lay dormant even though proponents of the amendment,
such as Thaddeus Stevens, had insisted that it was “the most important [section]
in the article,” because it would “either compel the states to grant universal
suffrage or so . . . shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a

50. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 13. See generally BLIGHT,
supra note 16, at 347–48.
51. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 63; see also NIEMAN, supra note
31, at 121–23.
52. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 63.
53. See id. at 64; NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 121.
54. WILKERSON, supra note 47, at 271–73. Over twenty northern cities had race riots in 1919.
See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 64; NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 121.
55. WILKERSON, supra note 47, at 273.
56. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 38.
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hopeless minority in the national Government.”57 And when Democrats
attained control of both Congress and the presidency in 1893–1894, they
repealed much of the federal voting rights legislation enacted during the 1870s
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment; Republicans made no effort to reenact
these measures when they regained control in 1897.58
And, of course, the Supreme Court significantly affected both the statutory
and constitutional landscape by striking down the 1875 Civil Rights Act’s
prohibition of discrimination in public accommodations in the Civil Rights
Cases59 and upholding state segregation laws in Plessy v. Ferguson.60 There
were occasional victories. Most prominently, Strauder v. West Virginia61
struck down a state law limiting jury service to whites and offered a ringing
affirmation that the Fourteenth Amendment “was designed to assure to the
colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed
by white persons.”62 “What is this,” Justice William Strong’s majority opinion
asked, “but declaring . . . that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States, and in regard to the colored race . . . that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color?”63
Strauder’s holding seems obvious today, but there were plausible
arguments the other way.64 The Court’s holding is thus all the more impressive
as a reaffirmation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to equality. But

57. Quoted in GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 226 (2006); see also Earl M. Maltz, The
Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth Amendment: Section 2 and the Evolution of American
Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149 (2015).
58. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 38. Republicans’ fading
interest in black voting rights may, at least in part, have been because “[t]he electoral realignment of
the mid-1890s rendered Republicans less dependent on, and thus less motivated to protect, southern
black voters.” Id.
59. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
61. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
62. Id. at 306.
63. Id. at 307.
64. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789–1888, at 384–85 (1985). In particular, considerable evidence suggested that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected “civil” but not “political” rights, and jury service fell in the latter
basket. See id. The Court avoided this problem by focusing on the rights of the defendant, not the
juror, but all defendants were arguably treated in the same way by the law. See id. These counterarguments may not strike contemporary observers as compelling, but they are similar to arguments that
the Court found persuasive in other cases. See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding
a statute imposing more severe penalties for adultery or fornication if the participants were of different
races, on the ground that it treated black and white defendants alike).
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the holding had little practical effect.65 Few states formally barred blacks from
juries, and nothing in Strauder foreclosed exclusion based on criteria such as
not being on the list of registered voters. Hence, “[a]s whites suppressed black
voting, blacks disappeared from juries.”66 Moreover, many states excluded
blacks from juries by imposing discretionary criteria administered by white
supremacist officials. Although the Supreme Court held that such executive
discrimination was actionable, subsequent decisions made such a case nearly
impossible to prove.67 Even civil rights victories such as Strauder thus failed
to impede the re-entrenchment of racial oppression in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s early decades.68
Let’s be clear: The failure of the Fourteenth Amendment was not simply a
failure to progress far enough or fast enough. That sort of failure would still be
consistent with a Whig history of ineluctable progress: even if we are frustrated
at the slow pace of change, it’s still always onward and upward. But the arc of
the moral universe does not always bend toward justice—sometimes things get
a little better, then take a turn for the worse.69 Thus, as Professor Woodward
related, “racial segregation in the South in the rigid and universal form it had
taken by 1954 did not appear with the end of slavery, but toward the end of the
century and later.”70 Lynchings and other forms of violence against blacks
65. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 41.
66. Id. at 39.
67. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346–49 (1879) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
forbade judicial and executive officers from excluding black jurors); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
397 (1880) (holding that proof of a pattern of all-white juries “presented a prima facie case” of
unconstitutional discrimination); NIEMAN, supra note 31, at 97–98 . But see KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 42 (noting that subsequent cases watered down Neal and deferred to
state court findings on discrimination, and that in any event the absence of blacks from voter rolls
“largely nullified Strauder”).
68. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 40 (“For the first three decades of
the twentieth century, essentially no blacks sat on southern juries.”).
69. President Barack Obama re-popularized Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assertion that “the arc of
the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice,” which was in turn a quotation from an 1853
sermon by Unitarian minister Theodore Parker. In context, Obama, King, and Parker all seem not to
have intended the phrase to mean that history is predetermined or that progress is inevitable. See, e.g.,
Mychal Denzel Smith, Opinion, The Truth About ‘The Arc of the Moral Universe,’ HUFFPOST (Jan.
18,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-smith-obamaking_us_5a5903e0e4b04f3c55a252a4 [https://perma.cc/9LST-6M3S]; Matt Lewis, Obama Loves
Martin Luther King’s Great Quote—But He Uses It Incorrectly, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 16, 2017)
https://www.thedailybeast.com/obama-loves-martin-luther-kings-great-quotebut-he-uses-itincorrectly [https://perma.cc/B2PV-QB88]; Barack Obama, A New Era of Service Across America,
TIME (Mar. 19, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1886571,00.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8KN-QVLK].
70. C. VANN WOODWARD, THINKING BACK: THE PERILS OF WRITING HISTORY 82–83 (1986);
see also JACKSON LEARS, REBIRTH OF A NATION: THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA, 1877–1920,
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plainly got worse toward the end of the nineteenth century, and they extended
into the North as blacks migrated there after 1900. National authorities’
willingness to intervene on blacks’ behalf peaked during Reconstruction and
dwindled to little or nothing after 1876. W. E. B. DuBois summed it all up in
what has to be one of the most heartbreaking lines in American history: “[T]he
slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward
slavery.”71
All this went on for some time. Others have charted the Fourteenth
Amendment’s comeback in the second half of the twentieth century, and while
it would be interesting to pin down the key turning points and their causes, that
is not my subject. My question is what we can learn from the amendment’s
initial, long-lasting failure. The first step, I submit, is to realize that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s lost years can be understood not simply as a failure
of constitutionalism, but also as a form of constitutionalism. The Southern
Redeemers who recaptured state governments and implemented Jim Crow; the
Northern Democrats who sought to minimize the results of the war and repealed
Reconstruction measures when they had the chance; the liberal and moderate
Republicans who withdrew federal troops from the South and redirected their
agenda away from civil rights; and the judges who narrowly construed the
Reconstruction Amendments’ terms—all these groups had their own
constitutional visions, and their words and actions all contributed to the shaping
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning over time.
This is living constitutionalism in action. Different theorists of living
constitutionalism stress different mechanisms by which changes over time get
translated into constitutional meaning. But, as I hope to demonstrate in the next
section, the same mechanisms that living constitutionalists rely on to make
constitutional meaning better and better over time—social movements,
at 93 (2010) (“[E]ven after Reconstruction, as white Democrats returned to power, race relations
remained fluid among the folk. By the 1890s, the fluidity was gone. Lynching was only the most
brutal and sensational example of a concerted white effort to reassert absolute dominance by drawing
the sharpest possible boundaries between the races.”).
71. Quoted in FONER, supra note 12, at 602. There is an historical debate about Professor
Woodward’s claim that segregation did not characterize the immediate postwar South. See generally
Howard N. Rabinowitz, More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing The Strange Career of Jim Crow,
75 J. AM. HIST. 842 (1988). The answer seems to be that things were hardly great for black people
prior to Jim Crow, but that there was nonetheless a significant hardening of segregation around the
turn of the twentieth century. But in two respects that are more relevant for my thesis than for
Woodward’s—violence in the South and Northern willingness to intervene—the evidence is less
equivocal. Woodward’s is an argument about changes in policies adopted by Southern governments
over time; my concern is with the understanding and efficacy of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
guarantee of black equality before the law. The declining ability of federal officials to protect black
rights and lives, and those officials’ increasing disinclination to try, is surely central to the latter issue.
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movements of public opinion, electoral and legislative politics, common-law
development—all took the Fourteenth Amendment, during the first seventyfive years of its life, further and further from its noble aspirations.
II. THE LIVING CONSTITUTIONALIST CASE FOR RE-ENTRENCHED RACIAL
OPPRESSION
The resurgence of white supremacy after Reconstruction took place across
a wide range of social and political contexts—for example, segregation of
public accommodations, schools, transport, and residential neighborhoods;
voting and jury service; peonage and other forms of labor relations; and the
operation of the criminal justice system. Each of these contexts raised different
legal issues, implicated the three Reconstruction Amendments to varying
degrees, and was resolved by courts and government officials with varying
degrees of plausibility. To oversimplify greatly, courts tended to strike down
formal or particularly blatant violations of the amendments,72 and they
sometimes went further when racial equality intersected with key elements of
the Court’s agenda in other areas, such as the protection of property rights.73
But courts narrowly construed certain provisions,74 often ignored
discriminatory motives for facially neutral laws,75 and tended to permit
discriminatory administration of the law to do what formal discrimination could
not.76 Other government actors—such as Congress and the President—likewise
largely failed to read the Fourteenth Amendment as obliging them to intervene
on behalf of black Americans.
The evolving social and political context in which the Court and other
officials construed the Reconstruction Amendments could have affected the
Court’s interpretation, regardless of whether justices of the day considered
themselves to be living constitutionalists. A provision such as the Fourteenth
Amendment, which purports not to entrench an existing set of rights or
institutional arrangements but rather to force reform to achieve some desired

72. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down grandfather clause
exempting whites from literacy test for voting); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)
(striking down formal ban on black jury service).
73. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down a residential segregation
ordinance on due process grounds).
74. See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (construing statute imposing heavier
penalties for adultery and fornication on interracial couples not to deny equal protection).
75. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (rejecting claim that legislature had
racial motive for imposing voter registration requirements).
76. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (rejecting claim of unfair administration
of facially neutral juror qualification rule).
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future state, is particularly prone to indeterminacy.77 Different proponents and
supporters, after all, may have quite different visions of that future state, and
they may or may not express those visions with any degree of precision in the
text. To the extent that a provision’s original meaning is uncertain, the evolving
social and political context is likely to press courts and other interpreters in the
direction of one resolution or another.78 The influence of context can be
conscious or unconscious, and when it is conscious, judges may be candid or
not. In any event, my question is whether standard living constitutionalist
arguments could have provided plausible reasons to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment the way that courts interpreted it in this period. If they could have,
then we must grapple with the risk that living constitutionalism can be a recipe
for constitutional failure.
To be clear, my argument is not that this problem of “dying
constitutionalism” proves we should reject evolutionary or organic theories of
constitutional meaning in favor of some other methodology. I doubt that a
better methodology is out there. My point is simply that there is no necessary
connection between living constitutionalism and moral progress. Nor do I think
we are likely to find a way to build in such a guarantee. I suggest that, rather,
we will get better results out of living constitutionalism if we spend more time
worrying about the downside risks.
To illustrate those risks, it will help to be more specific about the
mechanisms of living constitutionalism. Like constitutional interpretation
generally, living constitutionalism has its modalities—that is, its methods of
justifying particular propositions of constitutional meaning. 79 From this
perspective, constitutional meaning is at least partially a function of evolving
public opinion or consensus;80 the more specific activities of social
movements;81 political events and actions such as elections,82 landmark

77. See Greene, supra note 11, at 981.
78. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 5.
79. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991) (defining
“constitutional modalities” as “the ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a
constitutional point of view”). The modalities of living constitutionalism I describe here could
probably be grouped under Bobbitt’s headings of “historical,” “doctrinal,” “ethical,” and “prudential”
argument. See id. at 12–13. But it helps to be more specific about the spin that living constitutionalism
puts on these categories.
80. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1207, 1224 (2010).
81. See, e.g., BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 11; Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the
De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1351–52 (2006).
82. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 7, at 6, 83.
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legislation,83 or established official practices;84 and the evolution of doctrine
through common-law processes of judicial reasoning.85 Different scholars
emphasize different modalities, but I want to cast my net broadly. The
modalities I have just listed are generally the ones identified as means by which
constitutional meaning grows, evolves, and generally becomes more just. My
point is that they can also be means by which it mutates, decays, and dies.
Start with public opinion. We lack polling data for the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, but there is little question that the proponents of the
Reconstruction Amendments and of the civil rights laws passed pursuant to
them walked a tightrope between their commitment to some measure of black
equality and the residual racism and resistance to change of even the Northern
electorate.86 That electorate had a far more limited conception of equality than
would be acceptable today; perhaps more important, it was weary of conflict
after four years of war in which 360,000 Union soldiers died. To the extent that
the general views of the American public exercise a gravitational pull on
constitutional interpretation by the Court,87 Northern weariness and reluctance,
as well as the South’s violent recalcitrance, were bound to impede realization
of the amendments’ redemptive ideals.88
The Reconstruction Amendments were especially dependent on the acts of
the political branches. The open-ended text of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
first section needed more detailed legislation to specify and flesh out its
meaning. Consequently, the three Reconstruction Amendments were the first
to include their own enumerated-powers provisions conferring on Congress the
authority to implement their provisions by appropriate legislation. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866, for example, has always played a prominent role in

83. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215–16
(2001).
84. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2015).
85. See, e.g., Strauss, Living Constitution, supra note 9, at 890–91.
86. See, e.g., DAVID DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1867 (1984);
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 11, at 144–47.
87. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 6.
88. Moreover, the circumstances of the Reconstruction Amendments were unique, as each had
been ratified without the conventional consent of the states upon which their provisions would operate
most directly. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 111 (2000).
Whatever that means for the legitimacy of the Amendments themselves—and I take that to be a
basically moot point—it poses a problem in terms of living constitutionalism. Because of the
supermajority requirements for ratification, a constitutional amendment typically represents a broad
consensus at least at the moment it is adopted. But the circumstances of Reconstruction, under which
much of the country ratified the Reconstruction Amendments under duress, made ratification possible
without that kind of broad support.
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construing the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning.89 Statutes of that sort are
important to living constitutionalists who stress the role of political institutions
in shaping evolving constitutional meaning.
But constitutional theories according a prominent role to political branch
“constructions” of constitutional meaning90 or the operation of “constitutional
politics” in times of foundational political ferment91 must take account of what
happened not just in the 1860s but also in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s.92 The
election of 1876, for example, bears many indicia of Professor Bruce
Ackerman’s “constitutional moments”; it had the highest participation rate in
American history (at least among white voters), and fundamental issues about
Reconstruction and the propriety of military intervention in the South were on
the table.93 And although the resulting electoral deadlock hardly demonstrated
any kind of national consensus,94 the machinations that resolved the deadlock
did effectively shape the implementation and interpretation of the
Reconstruction Amendments for generations.95 Likewise, congressional
decisions not to invoke Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose
of reducing Southern representation as a result of black disfranchisement and
to repeal much of the Reconstruction-era voting rights legislation96 reflected a
changed sense of Congress’s constitutional responsibilities, with profound
consequences for the nation. The rules of recognition for constitutional change
arising from elections or political-branch actions have never been clear. But if
such things are to count toward constitutional meaning, then the actions of the
late nineteenth century have a plausible claim on our attention.

89. Once Republicans lost control of the House of Representatives in 1874, however, Congress
“ceased to be an important interpreter” of the Amendment and the primary role shifted to the federal
courts. NELSON, supra note 14, at 149. Later Congresses nonetheless shaped the broader meaning of
the Amendment by what they failed to do. See infra notes 92 and 96 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001).
91. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 7, at 132–33.
92. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 12, at 553–56 (describing the failure by Republican “stalwarts”
to enact a legislative program in 1875 that would have forcibly safeguarded Reconstruction); KENNETH
M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865–1877, at 209–10 (noting the collapse of Republican
efforts to protect Southern blacks after 1874).
93. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, BY ONE VOTE: THE DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876, at
164–65, 167–68 (2008); WHITE, supra note 21, at 327–30.
94. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 7, at 83.
95. See FONER, supra note 12, at 587 (observing that “Reconstruction came to an irrevocable
end with the inauguration of Hayes”).
96. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 57, at 178 (noting Congress’s failure to invoke Section 2 to
penalize black disfranchisement in Southern states); STAMPP, supra note 92, at 214 (noting Congress’s
repeal of the Force Acts in 1894).

YOUNG, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

966

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/28/2019 2:48 PM

[102:949

What about social movements? The re-entrenchment of racial oppression
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century featured contributions from a
variety of mobilized social groups, including white supremacist Redeemers
who retook control of Southern state governments; anti-immigrant populists
and progressives who came to sympathize with Southern racialism; labor
unions fearing competition from black workers; and significant components of
the women’s movement, which had opposed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments on the ground that they failed to extend their gains to women.97 I
want to focus, however, on a more seemingly benign social movement: the
broad effort to achieve national reunion and heal the wounds left by the Civil
War.
A favorite Republican electioneering tactic in the postwar nineteenth
century was to “wave the bloody shirt”—that is, to tie Democrats to the late
Rebellion and to campaign on Republican loyalty to the Union cause.98 So the
strength of the movement for reunion and reconciliation during the same period
may be somewhat surprising. And yet a prominent movement soon developed
around decoration days to remember the war dead, a burgeoning and generally
nostalgic popular literature telling soldiers’ stories, and veterans’ organizations
and reunions that eventually reached across sectional lines.99 This movement
tended to emphasize the valor and honor of the combatants and to soft-pedal
the divisive issues, especially slavery and race, that underlay the war.
Historian David Blight has written that because “race was so deeply at the
root of the war’s causes and consequences, and so powerful a source of division
in American social psychology,” it was “the antithesis of a culture of
reconciliation.”100 For that reason,
[t]he memory of slavery, emancipation, and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments never fit well into a developing
narrative in which the Old and New South were romanticized
and welcomed back to a new nationalism, and in which
devotion alone made everyone right, and no one truly wrong,
in the remembered Civil War.101
Hence, in 1913, President Woodrow Wilson gave a commemorative address at
Gettysburg, on the fiftieth anniversary of the great battle:
How wholesome and healing the peace has been! We have

97. See FONER, supra note 12, at 588 (discussing the Redeemers); EPPS, supra note 57, at 214–
21 (discussing the women’s movement).
98. See BLIGHT, supra note 16, at 51–52.
99. See generally id.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id.
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found one another again as brothers and comrades in arms,
enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long
past, the quarrel forgotten—except that we shall not forget the
splendid valor, the manly devotion of the men then arrayed
against one another, now grasping hands and smiling into each
other’s eyes. How complete the union has become . . . . 102
On the one hand, the reunion was marvelous. No one wants to be
Yugoslavia, where people still kill each other over grievances from centuries
ago. Reunion not only brought real healing to many, but also permitted the
nation to become the preeminent defender of democracy and human rights on
the world stage not long after Wilson spoke.
But President Wilson also symbolized the cost of the forgetting that made
reunion possible. The first Southern president since the Civil War, he presided
over segregation of much of the federal government. And so, as Professor
Blight has written, “[i]n the half century after the war, as the sections
reconciled, by and large, the races divided.”103
The reunion movement had another consequence that mattered for
constitutional interpretation. Anyone who thinks history is always written by
the winners hasn’t studied the historiography of the Civil War and
Reconstruction. For much of the twentieth century, that historiography was
dominated by the “Lost Cause” myth of the war, which held that the South had
fought for its freedom, not for slavery,104 and the Dunning School of
Reconstruction history, which insisted that Reconstruction was a malicious
attempt by vindictive radicals to punish the South and foist freedom on a black
race that was fundamentally unready for it.105 “The demeaning of black people
as helpless, sentimental children and the crushing of their adult rights to
political and civil liberty under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments”
were integral parts of this ideology.106 These interpretations would hold sway
until the late twentieth century and inform the Supreme Court whenever it
turned to history in its deliberations.
One could, of course, focus on other social movements—the Redeemers,
for instance—that challenged the legitimacy of the Reconstruction
Amendments, pushed for as narrow an interpretation as possible, and tried
(often with considerable success) to block their enforcement. The central point,

102. Quoted in id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at 255–58.
105. See WILLIAM A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1865–1877
(1907); FONER, supra note 12, at xix–xx (describing the Dunning School and the reaction against it).
106. BLIGHT, supra note 16, at 272.
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however, should already be obvious. Living constitutionalists such as Professor
Jack Balkin extol social movements as motors of moral progress. “[W]e
understand many important social movements in American history,” Balkin has
written, “as working out the meaning of the Declaration and the Constitution,
engaging in popular uprisings that help to redeem their promises.”107 But as
Professor Scot Powe has pointed out, “mass movements . . . that have set
themselves out to overturn an existing legal order have sometimes been
wonderful—the Civil Rights Movement jumps first to mind—but equally as
often they have been horrible.”108
Many living constitutionalists—such as Professor David Strauss—have
turned to courts as more-institutionally-regular expositors of evolving
constitutional meaning. The extent to which the Republican architects of
Reconstruction eschewed reliance on the courts has sometimes been
exaggerated. Despite the debacle of Dred Scott and continuing concerns that
the Court would undermine military Reconstruction, Congress made Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment self-executing—that is, directly enforceable by
courts.109 Congress also expanded federal court jurisdiction and created federal
civil rights causes of action and federal prosecutorial authority to enforce the
amendment’s promises.110 The federal court system as we know it dates from
Reconstruction.
But the courts’ record in the amendment’s early decades would likely have
disappointed many of its framers. In key decisions, the federal courts read
aspects of the amendment narrowly,111 accorded significant discretion to biased
state and local administrators,112 and refused to provide effective remedies for
potential violations.113
Some have accused the Supreme Court of strangling the Fourteenth
Amendment in its crib,114 but that charge is overstated. In the Slaughter-House
Cases,115 to be sure, the Court did interpret the amendment more narrowly than

107. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 11, at 26.
108. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 855, 893 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
109. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 55; HYMAN, supra note 14, at 468.
110. See HYMAN, supra note 14, at 468–76, 529–30, 540–42.
111. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (defining narrowly the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizenship).
112. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
113. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
114. See, e.g., EPPS, supra note 57, at 263–64; see also WHITE, supra note 21, at 282 (asserting
that the Court “expedited” the “dismantling of Reconstruction” in the Slaughter-House Cases).
115. 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1872).
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it might have done. The New Orleans ordinance challenged in Slaughter-House
conferred a local monopoly on the owners of a particular abattoir. Some
butchers left out by this law challenged it under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the Court insisted that “the one pervading purpose” of the
Reconstruction Amendments was “the freedom of the slave race, the security
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him.”116 The majority found little connection between
that purpose and the plaintiffs’ legal claim. Notwithstanding the broader scope
of Republicans’ free-labor ideology, it is hard to argue with the Court’s
conclusion: the Civil War was not fought to uphold the rights of white butchers
to defy local sanitation laws.
Critics complain that Slaughter-House wrongly construed the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause not to apply the Bill of Rights
to the states, but it’s hard to see how that would have helped the butchers. And,
in any event, that dictum has been readily circumvented since then by
incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause. What the butchers
needed was for the Court to adopt into the Fourteenth Amendment Justice
Bushrod Washington’s open-ended formulation of “privileges and
immunities,” under the similar language of Article IV, from an 1823 case called
Corfield v. Coryell.117 Justice Washington’s capacious formulation—which
included “the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety”118—may be broad enough to include the right
to dismember animals wherever you want, but it could also include just about
any other right one might dream up. That’s mostly all right under Article IV,
because that provision allows states to define which privileges and immunities
they actually wish to protect and then simply restricts them from discriminating
with respect to those rights between in-staters and out-of-staters. But what the
butchers wanted in Slaughter-House was for the Court to define these broad
privileges and immunities and protect them against any encroachment, whether
discriminatory or not. That was tantamount to an invitation to write a new
constitution, and it is not hard to see why the Court declined.
It’s more plausible to point the finger at the Civil Rights Cases.119 Those
cases were federal prosecutions, under the 1875 Civil Rights Act, of various

116. Id. at 71.
117. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
118. Id. at 551–52.
119. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court’s opinion governed five consolidated suits—United States v.
Stanley, United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols, United States v. Singleton, and Robinson v.
Memphis & Charleston Railroad—all brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
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operators of public accommodations—including Maguire’s Theatre in San
Francisco and the Grand Opera House in New York City—for refusing to serve
black patrons. The Court struck down the act on the ground that it exceeded
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
confers legislative authority to prohibit and punish actions that would be
unconstitutional under Section 1. The trouble, the Court said, was that private
discrimination is not unconstitutional under Section 1, which imposes
obligations on states, and thus Congress had no authority under Section 5 to
legislate against such discrimination.120
I have never heard a serious argument that the Constitution should not have
a state-action requirement, and that requirement is absolutely basic to modern
constitutional law. Without it, I as a private citizen would have to give my son
notice and a hearing under the Due Process Clause before grounding him for
staying out too late on Saturday night.121 The better criticism is that the failure
of states such as California and New York—and, obviously, the recalcitrant
states of the Old Confederacy—to prohibit race discrimination by places of
public accommodation was state action.122 After all, “public accommodations”
in the law are largely defined by their legal obligation to serve all comers,123
and the refusal to enforce this preexisting and general requirement on behalf of
black people surely denied them the “equal protection of the laws.” Publicaccommodations laws, however, were subject to an exception for “reasonable”
requirements. And in the railroad context, common-law decisions since the
1850s had upheld segregation on the ground that “‘repugnancies’ between the
races arising from natural differences created friction that segregation could
minimize.”124 From this perspective, the Civil Rights Cases prefigure the
Court’s later holding in Plessy v. Ferguson125 that separate but equal public
accommodations satisfy the reasonableness requirement for valid police-power
legislation.

120. See id. at 13 (“[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action through its
officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding
under such legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against
State laws and acts done under State authority.”).
121. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (“Careful adherence to
the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal
law and federal judicial power.”).
122. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 58–59 (Harlan, J., dissenting); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-2, at 1693–95 (2d ed. 1988).
123. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (discussing the common law
prohibition of discrimination by operators of public accommodations).
124. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 20.
125. 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896).
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It is fair to say that, in the Fourteenth Amendment’s early decades, the
common-law development of the amendment’s meaning pushed in the same
direction as the other modalities of living constitutionalism—that is, to
undermine and narrow the amendment’s commitment to black equality. It is
not clear how much practical impact the courts’ decisions had. Professor
Michael Klarman has written that “[t]he 1875 [Civil Rights] Act was essentially
a dead letter before the Court invalidated it in 1883 . . . . Blacks seeking to
enforce their statutory rights of access to public accommodations frequently
encountered hostility and violence.”126 It is thus no coincidence that none of
the consolidated Civil Rights Cases came from the Deep South. But “[e]ven
public accommodations laws in northern states had proved inconsequential in
practice.”127 More broadly, the Court’s decisions in this era likely “reflected,
far more than they created, the regressive racial climate of the era.”128
There is one last modality to consider: violence.129 Echoing Clausewitz,
historian George Rable has written of Reconstruction that “for the South, peace
became war carried on by other means.”130 The Fourteenth Amendment’s first
decades offer a history of violence and death—lynchings, murderous race riots,
and other forms of terrorism and intimidation. No one thinks that violence is a
legitimate modality of living constitutionalism.131 But it is equally obvious that
violence powerfully affected aspects of history that are the raw material of
evolving constitutional meaning. Any method of living constitutionalism that
takes into account changes in the political and social world offers a route by
which the violence that is part of that world can creep into constitutional

126. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 49; accord FONER, supra note
12, at 556.
127. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 49.
128. Id. at 9; see also HYMAN, supra note 14, at 542 (“Judges did not create the descent, but with
rare exceptions they accepted it.”); FONER, supra note 12, at 587 (quoting a contemporaneous editorial
in The Nation as observing that widespread approval of the Court’s decision revealed “how completely
the extravagant expectations” aroused by the Civil War had “died out”).
129. See generally STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES
IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 265–313 (2003) (demonstrating
that paramilitary violence was neither sporadic nor aberrational in the Reconstruction and postReconstruction South, but rather a basic component of the political order).
130. GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS
OF RECONSTRUCTION 15 (1984).
131. The closest thing to such an argument is Larry Kramer’s peculiarly extra-institutional
argument for popular constitutionalism, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004), which lauds large (and often unruly) public
gatherings meant to pressure public institutions. I share Scot Powe’s worry that “mass meetings with
an agenda of complaint can—and have—lead to violence.” Powe, supra note 108, at 893. The basic
ambiguity of calls for popular constitutionalism unmediated by institutions, see id. at 882–83, leaves
the door wide open to a variety of dangers.

YOUNG, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

972

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/28/2019 2:48 PM

[102:949

meaning. Just as the violence of the Civil War settled a long-standing debate
about whether the Constitution permitted secession, the violence and terror of
whites’ rejection of black equality powerfully shaped the political, social, and
even legal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.132 As historian James
McPherson put it: “The road to redemption was paved with force. Power did
flow from the barrel of a gun.”133 I would add that law flowed from that barrel,
too.
Violence determined, for example, whether there would be litigation
invoking the Fourteenth Amendment. Mounting a legal challenge to
segregation was frightfully dangerous for African Americans, and until well
into the twentieth century they tended to do so only under very special
circumstances. Violence also framed the possible judicial resolutions of the
cases brought. In Giles v. Harris,134 for example, a black plaintiff alleged that
an Alabama law requiring registered voters to be of “good character and
understanding” effectively discriminated on the basis of race and demanded an
injunction compelling registration of black voters. Writing for the Court in
1903, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said that even if the administration of
such a requirement could be challenged as discriminatory, the plaintiff would
have to seek relief from the national political branches. He explained:
[T]he great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more
than ordering the plaintiff’s name to be inscribed upon the
[voting] lists of 1902 will be needed. If the conspiracy and the
intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat them.
Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that state by
officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff
could get from equity would be an empty form.135
It is instructive to compare Giles with the 1958 decision in Cooper v.
Aaron.136 Cooper held emphatically that Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus’s
effort to mobilize “the great mass of the white population”—not to mention the
National Guard—in order to prevent blacks from attending white schools could
not be permitted to interfere with a federal injunction under the Fourteenth
132. See, e.g., HAHN, supra note 129, at 310–13 (discussing how Southern violence shaped
changes in the Northern commitment to democracy and equality in the 1870s).
133. James M. McPherson, Redemption or Counterrevolution? The South in the 1870s, 13 REV.
IN AM. HIST. 545, 549 (1985) (review essay) (emphasis omitted).
134. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
135. Id. at 488; see also KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 36 (“The
extraordinary Giles opinions are among the Court’s most candid confessions of limited power. The
only analogous statements appear in cases where the justices confessed their inability to protect civil
liberties during wartime.”).
136. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Amendment. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s deployment of federal troops
to Little Rock was a statement that the federal government would no longer
tolerate the “autumnal uprisings in the South” that President Grant had been
unwilling or unable to suppress. The irony of Cooper v. Aaron, then, is that the
most categorical statement of judicial supremacy in the U.S. Reports137
depended for much of its power on the Executive’s demonstrated willingness
to enforce the Court’s decree through force if necessary. There was no such
willingness during the Fourteenth Amendment’s lost decades.
Finally, a word about originalism is in order. As I stated earlier, my critique
of living constitutionalism is not an argument for originalism as an alternative
mode of constitutional interpretation. I don’t really think that originalism can
help. The first reason is that many originalists have concluded that the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment entails a general and fairly openended commitment to equality. Robert Bork, for example, said that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s framers “intended that the Supreme Court should
secure against government action some large measure of racial equality,” but
that “those same men were not agreed about what the concept of racial equality
requires. Many or most of them had not even thought the matter through.”138
Hence a court applying the Equal Protection Clause must fall back on a “core
idea of black equality against governmental discrimination,” defined at a
relatively high level of generality.139 Bork was comfortable with courts
working out this principle in specific cases and untroubled by the prospect that
this might entail consequences that the framers themselves did not foresee.140
Critics of originalism decry this account as giving away a chief advantage
claimed by originalism—constraining unelected judges—by leaving
contemporary judges unconstrained as they fill in the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause’s open-ended language.141 That is fair enough, but it hardly
means that Judge Bork’s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original
137. See id. at 17–18 (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution. . . . It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”).
138. Bork, supra note 5, at 14.
139. Id. at 14–15.
140. See id. This recognition by leading originalists that there simply was no coherent original
understanding of the Amendment’s bearing on most contemporary Fourteenth Amendment
controversies seems consistent with the historical literature. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 14, at 61
(arguing that the Amendment can be understood only by “recogniz[ing] that the resolution of specific
legal issues, such as who should possess the right to vote, was not the raison d’etre of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); FONER, supra note at 257–58 (viewing the Amendment as a “broad statement[] of
principle” guaranteeing “equality before the law,” but recognizing that “[o]n the precise definition of
equality before the law, Republicans differed among themselves”).
141. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bork’s Dilemma, 76 VA. L. REV. 337, 343–44 (1990) (book review).
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understanding is wrongheaded. That reading strikes me as almost certainly
correct. It does mean, however, that originalism cannot rescue us from the
perils of living constitutionalism when it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment.
If originalism respects the original understanding of constitutional text when
that understanding is open-ended, then its prospects will basically dovetail with
those of living constitutionalism.
Originalism is unlikely to bail us out for a second reason. The Supreme
Court’s decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly rest on
plausible—if not indubitably correct—interpretations of the historical evidence
of original meaning.142 Where the legal arguments are close on the merits, the
social and cultural forces expressed in the modalities of living constitutionalism
tend to play a decisive role. In other words, even if a good originalist case could
have been made against the result in Plessy or the Civil Rights Cases,143 it would
be a lot to expect for a court to buck the forces of contemporary politics on a
matter that is admittedly close. Living constitutionalism is not just an
alternative methodology to originalism; it also sums up a variety of forces
operating on courts regardless of the method that they set out to employ.
Neither of these points means that originalism will never have comparative
advantages over living constitutionalism in preventing the deterioration of
constitutional norms over time. Where the original understanding is clear and
specific, originalism will generally do a better job at preserving a constitutional
principle intact. But the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history are
sufficiently open-ended and uncertain to leave originalists and living
constitutionalists in essentially the same leaky boat.

142. KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 9.
143. The Supreme Court has insisted—rightly, to my mind—that Plessy was “wrong the day it
was decided,” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (plurality opinion).
But I am persuaded that the case was not a slam dunk from an originalist perspective, and that strong
living constitution-style arguments can be made for it. On the originalist side, scholars as diverse as
Robert Bork, Jack Balkin, and Michael Klarman have pointed out that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment tended to view it as protecting civil rights (such as freedom of contract and access to
courts), but not political rights (such as voting) or social rights (such as interracial marriage or
integration). See Bork, supra note 5, at 14–15; BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note
11, at 144–48; KLARMAN, JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 19. That distinction creates
a strong originalist argument for the result in Plessy. The originalist argument against would point out
that the text does not include this distinction, and emphasize that subsequent experience demonstrated
that exclusion of social rights undermines both civil rights and the Amendment’s general commitment
to equality. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 11, at 149–51. As Judge Bork
pointed out, an originalist forced to choose might choose the general commitment either on textual
grounds (it is what the amendment actually says) or because the equality of separate facilities is not
susceptible to principled judicial policing. See Bork, supra note 5. But we are kidding ourselves if we
say this is an easy question either way.
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III. THE LESSONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE
I promised at the outset that if you walked with me through the dark valley
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s early decades, we would come out the other
side with some insights about constitutional theory. I did not promise, however,
that they would be sunny or uplifting. For me, the lessons of the amendment’s
years of failure are as follows.
To begin, this is at least in part a story about the limits of constitutionalism
itself. Importantly, I do not simply mean the limits of judicial review. Judicial
review doesn’t come off that well in my story, but neither do political-branch
actions or popular constitutionalism. After what is still the most devastating
war in American history, Americans tried to resolve the central issue of that
war—the oppression of black Americans—through a flurry of constitutional
creativity that had not been seen since the Founding and has not been equaled
since. The resulting amendments, in and of themselves, failed to do what their
framers set out to do. They could not prevent the condition of the freedpeople
from deteriorating radically after the withdrawal of Union troops from the
South.144 And they did not achieve real progress until the country itself had
changed, nearly a century later. You cannot change basic social conditions
simply by changing the Constitution.
One might think this to be simply a problem with the subset of
constitutional principles that purport to be “redemptive” or “aspirational” in
nature. And surely it is easier to constitutionally entrench a state of affairs that
has already been achieved than it is to move the social mountain by ratifying
words on paper. But the story of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the
subsequent reassertion of racial oppression involves a failure not just of the
aspirational amendments but of any number of other constitutional principles.
For example, the original constitutional structures of federalism and separation
of powers, designed to mediate conflict and preserve liberty, failed of that
mission both before and after the war. Conflict over race is the central drama
of our national story, and when push came to shove, constitutionalism was
unequal to it.
To that cheery observation let me add another: This is also a story about the
limits of constitutional methodology. Much debate in constitutional law
proceeds as if by getting the methodology right, we could perfect American
constitutionalism and guarantee good results. But it’s hard to see how any
methodology would have helped all that much in confronting the hostile
environment into which the Fourteenth Amendment was born. As I’ve

144. See, e.g., HYMAN, supra note 14, at 542 (“A quarter century later, the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments had become almost irrelevant for Negroes.”).
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suggested, originalism offers no solace here. The basic point is that any
methodology can be conducted well or poorly, and as far as I can tell,
interpretive methodologies generally do not themselves do much to ensure
excellent rather than miserable application. My aim here is to say something
about how the history I’ve canvassed might encourage living constitutionalists
to do their job well rather than poorly.
The first thing that living constitutionalists need to get straight is that there
is nothing inevitable about moral progress. The use of organic metaphors such
as “evolving meaning” can cause us to confuse constitutional development with
natural processes that may have some sort of direction hardwired into them.
Sometimes living constitutionalists seem to acknowledge that progress is not
inevitable. Jack Balkin, for instance, states that “[a] story of constitutional
redemption is . . . a story of contingency” that “does not claim that the eventual
redemption is assured. It claims only that we should strive to achieve it.”145
Yet most living constitutionalist accounts of our history have an optimistic,
onward-and-upward feel to them. Professor Balkin does not seem to recognize
that the very title of his book—Constitutional Redemption—dovetails precisely
with the name that the nineteenth-century Redeemers who reestablished white
supremacy, had for their constitutional project.
To overcome this myth of inevitability, living constitutionalism needs a
sense of tragedy. This may be the great contribution that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s lost years can offer to constitutional law. C. Vann Woodward
made a similar point about what the South had to offer America more generally.
Writing before Vietnam, Professor Woodward proposed Southern history as an
antidote to the “American . . . legend of success and invincibility.”146 He noted
that “Southern history, unlike American, includes large components of
frustration, failure, and defeat”:
An age-long experience with human bondage and its evils and
later with emancipation and its shortcomings did not dispose
the South very favorably toward such popular American ideas
as the doctrine of human perfectibility . . . . For these reasons
the utopian schemes and the gospel of progress that flourished
above the Mason and Dixon Line never found very wide
acceptance below the Potomac during the nineteenth
century.147

145. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 11, at 29.
146. C. Vann Woodward, The Search for Southern Identity, in WOODWARD, supra note 15, at
3, 18.
147. Id. at 19, 21.
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In this sense, ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment is the Constitution’s
South. It’s the part of the Constitution that failed (before rising again to
something better). It brings to constitutional law “[t]he experience of evil and
the experience of tragedy”148 needed to remind us that moral progress is not
inevitable, that social forces can push constitutional meaning in bad as well as
good directions, that living can turn into dying constitutionalism if we are not
very, very careful.
I don’t have much to offer beyond this. I doubt that there is some
identifiable methodological tweak that can guard constitutional interpretation
effectively against the possibility that history may move in the wrong direction.
If we let the movement of history into interpretation—as opposed to history’s
state at an originalist snapshot in time—then we let in the contingency that
comes with it. What I am suggesting is that constitutional culture may be more
important than constitutional method when it comes to hanging on to
constitutional values. I think we need to change the culture of living
constitutionalism if we are going to prevent future tragedies, like the dying
constitutionalism of the Fourteenth Amendment’s lost years.
To be more specific, we need not only to keep the downside risks of
evolving constitutional meaning firmly in mind, but also to make living
constitutionalism a little less lively. There needs to be a bit more locking-in
and a little less pushing forward, because forward motion can end up not being
forward at all. This is harder when a provision is, like the Fourteenth
Amendment, profoundly aspirational. But even there, we might have done
better had the amendment’s subsequent interpreters held a little more fast to the
amendment’s central, basic commitment to equality and been a little less
willing to modify that commitment in light of more-contemporary imperatives.
We need to remember that the Fourteenth Amendment’s retrogressive earlier
interpreters thought that they, too, were shaping constitutional meaning to
conform to current notions of justice. If we remember that, we’ll subordinate
our impulse to keep the Constitution “in tune with the times” to a principle of
“first do no harm.”
There is a cost to this, of course. A less frisky version of living
constitutionalism—we could call it “stiff-necked constitutionalism”—would
give up the exciting potential for surprising and inspiring moral growth. The
Constitution would still evolve, but more slowly and only in response to very
sustained trends over time. It might be harder, for example, to go from the
categorical rejection of gay rights in Bowers v. Hardwick149 to the embrace of

148. Id. at 21.
149. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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that principle in Lawrence v. Texas150 in just seventeen years. That would be a
loss. As my friend Professor Marin Levy has observed, “the trouble with tying
yourself to the mast is that, sooner or later, you’re on the mast.”151 But a stiffer,
creakier, even grumpier living constitutionalism might also make it harder to
go from ratification of a Fourteenth Amendment committed to black equality
to the Civil Rights Cases in fifteen years, or from a Fifteenth Amendment
committed to black suffrage to the abandonment of black voters to murderous
white supremacist mobs in just five.

150. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
151. Marin K. Levy, Duke Law School Fall Faculty Reception, Aug. 19, 2018.

